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SEVEN-CUM-ELEVEN: ROLLING THE TOXIC DICE 
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
Roger D. Colton* 
Kathleen U ehling** 
Dr. Michael F. Sheehan*** 
Recent years have seen the development of an increasing conflict 
between state environmental statutes and the federal bankruptcy 
laws. In 1978, Congress enacted legislation designed to facilitate the 
commercial reorganization of financially strapped businesses. 1 One 
impact of these reforms has been a dramatic increase in the number 
of business bankruptcies. 2 The number of businesses that filed for 
either liquidation or reorganization nearly doubled between 1980 and 
1982 alone. 3 
Federal bankruptcy laws, however, have also increasingly become 
a bar to the enforcement of state and federal environmental stat-
utes. 4 In a recent report on the impacts of the financial closure of 
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1 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (amended 1984) 
(codified 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151104 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 
1985». For example, under the prior Bankruptcy Act, a company had to prove its insolvency 
to succeed in bankruptcy court. Chapter X, Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. 
No. 75-696, §§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). Under the new statute, however, a company need 
not make such a demonstration. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1982). 
2 Mersch and Cheng, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on Business Bankruptcy 
Filings, 36 ALA. L. REV. 539 (1985). This study involved a regression analysis (controlling 
for seasonal variations and economic trends) run on bankruptcy statistics from 1972 until 1983. 
3 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984, at 536 (104th ed.). 
4 Sibler, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by 
Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 871 n.14 (1985). One commentator posited that 
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hazardous waste disposal sites, the United States General Account-
ing Office (GAO) concluded that federal financial assurance 
requirements5 may not ensure that financially troubled or bankrupt 
firms pay closure and post-closure costs.6 In addition, GAO said, in 
three of the eight instances of closed or closing bankrupt facilities 
that it studied,7 the courts restricted federal and state efforts to 
force owners/operators to properly close the facilities. 8 In some in-
stances today, rather than paying the costs of complying with envi-
ronmental and safety regulations, companies and individuals instead 
simply opt for bankruptcy. 
It is reasonable to expect this conflict between financial and en-
vironmental policy to increase. 9 Congress has enacted strict new 
laws for the disposapo and cleanupll of toxic wastes. The federal 
government has chronicled its concern over the heightened clash 
between these laws, which are designed to protect the public's health 
and safety, and those laws designed to maintain or encourage the 
financial viability of industries. 12 The United States Supreme Court 
recently examined two different aspects of this conflict. In Ohio v. 
Kovacs,13 the Supreme Court held that the state-imposed obligations 
of an industry to spend money on toxic waste cleanup could be 
Congress simply did not foresee the conflict that would arise between the bankruptcy and 
environmental statutes. Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environmental Regulation: Harvest of 
Commercial Timber as an Introduction to A Clash of Policies, 12 ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1981) 
[hereinafter Aaron]. 
5 See infra notes 18....30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6962 (1982 & Supp. 
1985). See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements of 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
6 United States General Accounting Office, Hazardous Waste: Environmental Safeguards 
Jeopardized When Facilities Cease Operating, (February 1986) [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
GAO noted that 74 hazardous waste facilities had filed for bankruptcy by summer, 1985. Id. 
at 16. 
7The GAO studied hazardous waste sites in six states. Seventeen of those sites had declared 
bankruptcy. Of those seventeen, eight were closed or closing. Id. at 16. 
sId. at 2. 
9 See generally Aaron, supra note 4. 
10 See generally Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6962 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
11 See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
12 For example, GAO said that the potential exists for an increasing number of conflicts 
between the bankruptcy statute and hazardous waste requirements "in the next few years" 
as costly new federal hazardous waste requirements are implemented. GAO Report, supra 
note 6, at 29. 
13 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
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discharged through bankruptcy.14 In Midlantic National Bank v. 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,15 the Court 
held that a debtor company could not abandon property under the 
Code16 by arguing that the asset had no value. 17 
This article examines the development of the conflict between 
environmental and financial policy, reviews the status of the law in 
light of these recent Supreme Court decisions, and recommends 
necessary reforms. The article critiques the holdings of the Kovacs 
and Midlantic decisions. It concludes that sound legal and economic 
principles support refusing to permit the discharge of environmental 
clean-up costs. 
I. THE SOURCE OF THE CONFLICTS 
A. The RCRA and CERCLA Financial Assurance Requirements 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)18 sets out 
financial assurance requirements for the closure of hazardous waste 
facilities as well as their post-closure operations. "The assurances of 
financial responsibility and continuity of operation," Congress said, 
must be "consistent with the degree and duration of risks associated 
with the treatment, storage, or disposal of specified hazardous 
wastes. "19 Congress directed the Administrator of the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency to promulgate standards respecting, among 
other things, operations of hazardous waste facilities and qualifica-
tions as to ownership, continuity of operation, training for personnel, 
and financial responsibility (including financial responsibility for cor-
rective action) "as may be necessary or desirable. "20 RCRA stated 
that "financial responsibility" may be established by anyone or any 
combination of insurance, guarantee, surety bond, letter of credit, 
or qualification as a self-insurer. 21 
The EPA has promulgated rules setting forth the closure and post-
closure financial responsibility requirements for hazardous waste 
14 [d. at 283. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 67-77 and accom-
panying text, 
15 54 U.S.L.w. 4138 (January 28, 1986). 
16 11 u.s.c. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
17 54 U.S.L.W. at 4139. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 204-
222, and accompanying text. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6962 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1982). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
2142 U.S.C. § 6924(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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facilities. 22 The rules require owners or operators of hazardous waste 
facilities to close the facility in a manner that both minimizes any 
need for further maintenance and "controls, minimizes or eliminates" 
post-closure escape to the ground or surface waters or to the at-
mosphere to the extent "necessary to protect human health and the 
environment. "23 Post-closure care of hazardous waste facilities is to 
begin upon completion of the closure of the facility and to extend for 
thirty years.24 Closure involves certain monitoring and maintenance 
requirements as well as restrictions on the post-closure use of the 
property. 25 
The EPA rules require an owner or operator of a hazardous waste 
facility to establish financial assurances for compliance with both the 
closure26 and post-closure27 requirements. To make such assurances, 
the owner/operator must have a detailed written estimate, in current 
dollars, made of the cost of closing the facility in accordance with 
RCRA regulations. This estimate must equal the cost of final closure 
at the point in the facility's active life "when the extent and manner 
of its operation would make closure the most expensive."28 The 
closure cost must be adjusted annually for inflation.29 Similar re-
quirements exist for post-closure operating costs.30 
In a like fashion, the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)31 imposes 
certain financial assurance requirements on hazardous waste facili-
ties. CERCLA imposes liability on hazardous waste facility owners 
or operators for all costs of removal or remedial action by the United 
States or any state, for any other "necessary costs of response" by 
"any other person," for the costs of any health assessment or health 
effects study, and for "damages or injury to, destruction of, or loss 
22 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.110-264.120; Congress set forth the policy behind these rules in the 
preamble to the rules when adopted. 51 F.R. 16444 (May 2, 1986). 
23 40 C.F.R. § 264.111 (1986). 
24 40 C.F.R. § 264. 117(a) (1986). 
25 40 C.F.R. § 264.117 (1986). Requirements similar to those placed on "facilities" are placed 
on containers (40 C.F.R. § 264.178 (1986», tanks (40 C.F.R. § 264.197 (1986», surface im-
poundments (40 C.F.R. § 264.228 (1986», waste piles (40 C.F.R. § 264.258 (1986», land 
treatment (40 C.F.R. § 264.280 (1986», landfills (40 C.F.R. § 264.310 (1986» and incinerators 
(40 C.F.R. § 264.351 (1986». 
26 40 C.F.R. § 264.143 (1986). 
27 40 C.F.R. § 264.145 (1986). 
28 40 C.F.R. § 264. 142(a) (1986). 
29 40 C.F.R. § 264.142 (1986). 
30 40 C.F.R. § 264.144 (1986). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.1-265.430 (1986); 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 267.1-267.64 (1986). 
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such 
injury, destruction or loss .... "32 While facilities are responsible 
for the entire costs of response, there is a fifty million dollar liability 
limit on damages. 33 CERCLA authorizes the Administrator of the 
EPA to require financial assurances consisting of "evidence of finan-
cial responsibility consistent with the degree and duration of risk 
associated with the production, transportation, treatment, storage 
or disposal of hazardous substances. "34 
B. The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1978 
Beginning in 1970, Congress began a review of the long-standing 
issue of insolvency administration. 35 This process finally produced 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.36 The purpose of this statute 
was more than to account for "the pathology of moribund business."37 
It was also an attempt to "salvag[e] a source of jobs, products and 
taxes. "38 With reorganization proceedings in particular,39 allowing 
the bankrupt a "fresh start" is a major goal. 40 
Under the 1978 amendments, two types of actions are permitted 
for debtor corporations: (1) liquidation under chapter 7; and (2) re-
organization under chapter 11. 41 In a liquidation proceeding, all com-
pany property becomes part of an "estate. "42 The property is then 
32 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The total cost includes the payment of 
interest. I d. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (1982). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1) (1982). Post-closure liability, however, transfers to the federal 
"Post-closure Liability Trust Fund" if the owner or operator of the facility obtains a post-
closure permit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (1982 & Supp. 1985) and complies with 
the permit as well as with the standards of the statute and implementing regulations. 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(k) (1982). 
35 A. RESNICK & E. WYPYSKI, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY [hereinafter RESNICK & WYPYSKI]. 
36 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (amended 1984) 
(codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (1982 & Supp. III 
1985) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code]. 
37 Aaron, supra note 4, at 2. 
38 Id. 
39 See generally text accompanying notes 55-64 for a discussion of reorganization. 
40 H. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 6. This has been accepted 
as a goal of bankruptcy statutes for over 80 years. See, e.g., Hanover National Bank v. 
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); accord, In Re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972, (6th Cir. 1972), cen. denied, 
409 U.S. 877 (1972). The other goal is equity among creditors. See, e.g., Burlingham v. Crouse, 
228 U.S. 459 (1913); accord, Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962). 
41 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2558-59 (amended 1984) (codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 
(1982)). 
42 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a discussion, however, of what constitutes 
property "of the company," see infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text. In addition, 
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distributed among creditors according to a fixed scheme. The bank-
rupt's remaining debts are subsequently discharged.43 A discharge 
bars the further enforcement, against the debtor, of debts incurred 
prior to filing the bankruptcy petition.44 The discharge not only 
"voids any judgment" that is a determination of the personal liability 
of the debtor,45 but enjoins "any act" that seeks to "collect, recover 
or offset" a debt as a personal liability of the bankrupt. 46 
Two general exceptions exist to discharge. 47 First, there are debt-
ors who cannot have their debts discharged. 48 Grounds for denying 
discharge are related primarily to some sort of wrongdoing by the 
bankrupt such as fraud. 49 Second, there are debts that cannot be 
discharged. 50 These include, but are not limited to, taxes, and com-
pensation for willful and malicious injury to another entity. 51 
The estate of a chapter 7 debtor is administered by a trustee 
whose role is to represent the estate during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. 52 The trustee is to collect and reduce estate 
property to money, to close the estate as expeditiously as possible, 
and to account for all the property of the estate. 53 In addition, it is 
during the pendency of the liquidation, the court may authorize the trustee to operate the 
business of the debtor for a limited period of time. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1982). The income derived 
from such operations becomes part of the general fund to be used first for payment of 
administration expenses and, second, to expand the fund for payment to creditors. In Re 
Richter, 40 F. Supp. 758, 760 (D.C.N.Y. 1941). 
43 The right to a discharge and the effect of a discharge are two distinct legal questions. 
The right to a discharge is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the effect 
of a discharge is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
44 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982). "In effect, a chapter 7 liquidation separates the discharged 
debtor from his financial past, appropriating nonexempt assets for distribution to holders of 
pre-bankruptcy claims and barring further enforcement of those claims against the debtor in 
the absence of a statutory exception to discharge." Hennigan, Accommodating Regulatory 
Enforcement and Bankruptcy Protection, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7 (1985). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(I) (1982). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
47 Individual debtors are provided exceptions to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985) and 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(I) (1982). 
48 For a listing of when the court shall not grant the debtor a discharge, see, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 727(a)(1)-.(1O) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
49 Culpability is a necessary element in the denial of discharge in such instances. For 
example, discharge is denied if the debtor "with [the] intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a 
creditor" transfers, removes, destroys, mutilates, or conceals property. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) 
(1982). So, too, is there a denial if the debtor "knowingly and fraudulently" makes a false 
accounting. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (1982). 
50 For a listing of the debts that cannot be discharged, see, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)-.(9) (1982 
& Supp. III 1985). 
51 Jd.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
52 The appointment of a trustee must be done in compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1982). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
1987] TOXIC DICE 351 
within the prerogative of the trustee to abandon property of the 
estate determined to be of no value to the estate. 54 
In contrast to liquidation proceedings, a chapter 11 reorganization 
proceeding usually leaves the bankrupt in control of its assets. 55 The 
bankrupt prepares a plan to repay debts from post-bankruptcy in-
come. 56 The plan may be either accepted or rejected by creditors. 57 
In either case, the plan is to be presented to the courts for "confir-
mation." If all creditors accept the plan, the court "shall confirm the 
plan" if it meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. sec. 1129(a). To be 
confirmed, the reorganization plan must be feasible. 58 In addition, 
creditors are guaranteed to receive at least as much under a chapter 
11 reorganization as they would have received under a chapter 7 
liquidation. 59 If one or more classes of impaired creditors object to 
the plan, however, the debtor must invoke the Code's "cramdown" 
procedures. 6o To be confirmed in a cram down proceeding, the plan 
must meet each of the requirements of section 1129(a).61 The plan 
must also meet the requirement of section 1129(b) that the plan be 
"fair and equitable."62 To be "fair and equitable," the string of de-
ferred payments to the creditor must have a present value as of the 
effective date of the plan that is equal to the creditor's allowed 
claim.63 Under either type of corporate reorganization confirmation, 
all types of corporate debts are dischargeable. 64 
In Kovacs and Midlantic, the Supreme Court was faced with two 
procedural aspects of the Bankruptcy Code. In Kovacs, the Court 
addressed the issue of whether financial liability for hazardous waste 
cleanup was a "liability on a claim" and thus subject to discharge in 
54 For a discussion of abandonment see infra notes 214-224 and accompanying text. 
66 11 u.s.c. § 1107(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). All of the rights of a trustee also inhere in 
the debtor in possession in a reorganization with certain limited exceptions. [d. 
66 11 u.s.c. §§ 1121-1129 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
67 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
58 Feasibility is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1982). See, e.g., In Re Monnier Bros., 
755 F.2d 1336, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1985); cJ., In Re Fursman Ranch, 38 Bankr. 907, 911-12 
(W.D. Mo. 1984). 
59 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1982). 
60 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. III). 
61 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III). The one exception, by definition, is that the 
requirement of section 1129(a)(8), that all classes be unimpaired or accept the plan, need not 
be met. 
62 The term "fair and equitable" is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
63 See generally 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 11 1129.03 (15th ed. 1979). For an excellent general 
discussion of the "cramdown" requirements, see Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About 
'Cram Down' Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979). 
64 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1982). The same limits are placed on the discharge of individual 
debts in reorganization as in 11 U.S.C. § 523. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (1982). 
~-~~~~---------~~-.--
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bankruptcy.65 In M idlantic, the Supreme Court construed provisions 
of the Code that permit a bankruptcy trustee to abandon property 
which is either burdensome or of inconsequential value to the es-
tate. 66 
II. THE RECENT U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
A. The Case of Kovacs 
William Kovacs was the chief executive officer of the Chern-Dyne 
Corporation, an industrial and hazardous waste disposal facility lo-
cated in Hamilton, Ohio.67 In July, 1979, the State of Ohio obtained 
an injunction in state court requiring the removal of all hazardous 
waste from certain dumps owned by Chem-Dyne. 68 That order set a 
schedule that the company was required to keep.69 
Following Kovacs' failure to comply, the Ohio trial court appointed 
a receiver. 70 The court directed the receiver to take possession of all 
property and assets of Kovacs and to implement the cleanup.71 Ko-
vacs then filed a petition for personal bankruptcy in bankruptcy 
court.72 His filing occurred after the receiver had taken possession 
of the assets but before the receiver had completed the cleanup. 73 
65 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
66 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
67 The Chern-Dyne business involved "brokering, hauling, storing disposing and recycling 
... industrial and hazardous waste .... " In Re Kovacs, 29 Bankr. 816, 817 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1982), afl'd as to application of automatic stay provision 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982); 
aff'd as to dischargeab'ility in bankruptcy 718 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd 469 U.S. 274 
(1985). 
68 In Re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir, 1982). Ohio alleged that Kovacs and Chern-Dyne 
"had caused water pollution, nuisance conditions and fish kills in violation of Ohio law." 681 
F.2d at 454. The injunction was part of a July 18, 1979 "Stipulation and Judgment Entry," 
personally signed by Kovacs and filed in Ohio's Butler County Common Pleas Court. 681 F.2d 
at 454. The state proceeding was brought pursuant to Ohio's water pollution statute, OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6111.01-6111.99 (Baldwin 1982) and pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. 
§ 3767.12. Appendix at 43-44, Ohio v. Kovacs 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (No. 83-1020) [hereinafter 
Appendix]. 
69 The waste site, at the time of the order, was estimated to contain 850,000 gallons of toxic 
waste in liquid form and 4000 barrels in solid or semi-solid form. Appendix, supra note 64, at 
45. The schedule required the removal of 75,000 gallons, and 340 drums, per month with 
compliance to be determined on a quarterly basis. Id. at 46. 
70 681 F.2d at 454. See also Ohio v. Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 985 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting 
"pertinent portions" of the state court receivership order) afl'd 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
71 469 U.S. at 276. 
72 Id. at 276, n.2. He originally filed for reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code but subsequently converted it to a liquidation pursuant to chapter 7. 681 
F.2d at 455. 
73 469 U. S. at 276. 
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Nevertheless, hoping to apply part of Kovacs' personal post-bank-
ruptcy income to the work at the waste site,74 the State of Ohio 
sought discovery in state court of his current income and assets. 75 
The conflict over the cleanup obligation of Kovacs resulted in two 
separate court proceedings. First, Kovacs responded to the discov-
ery requests by seeking in bankruptcy court to stay the state court 
proceedings. (Kovacs 1).76 In a separate action, the state sought both 
a declaration that Kovacs' cleanup obligation was not ultimately 
dischargeable in bankruptcy, and an injunction preventing the bank-
ruptcy trustee from recovering Kovacs' assets from the receiver. 
(Kovacs II). 77 
In brief, Kovacs argued that the State of Ohio sought a monetary 
payment from him that was in essence simply a money judgment 
subject to discharge in bankruptcy as were all of his other "claims" 
and "debts. "78 In contrast, the State of Ohio argued that, because it 
was only seeking payment to effectuate the cleanup of Kovacs' haz-
ardous wastes, as directed by a state court, and was not seeking 
payment of money as an alternative to that cleanup or as compen-
sation for damages, there was no "claim" or "debt" subject to dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 
1. The Kovacs Decisions 
The Kovacs I bankruptcy judge concluded that the state sought 
information about Kovacs' current income "as a preliminary to re-
questing an order from that court which would require that part of 
debtor's current income be applied" to the receiver's efforts to com-
plete the unfulfilled obligation to clean up the Chern-Dyne wastes. 79 
The judge determined that Kovacs was entitled to an automatic stay 
under the Bankruptcy Code and enjoined the state from proceeding 
74 The state court excepted from the receivership "any property exempt from the control 
of a receiver by operation of law." 717 F.2d at 985. Nevertheless, the state expected that 
Kovacs ''would generate sufficient funds in his ongoing business to pay for the clean-up." 29 
Bankr. at 818. 
75 29 Bankr. at 816. The Bankruptcy Court stayed these state court proceedings per 11 
U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The federal district court agreed and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed. In Re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on unrelated 
grounds, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983). 
76 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983). 
77 See infra notes 91-94 and 115-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of what 
constitutes "claims" and "debts." 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 99-103. 
79 681 F.2d at 455. 
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further in its attempt to levy on Kovacs' post-petition earnings. 80 
According to the court, "there is no difference in substance between 
efforts to collect money from a debtor by securing a court order, and 
efforts to enforce a money judgment against him. "81 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.82 Under the auto-
matic stay provision, the court noted, "all entities" are prevented 
from pursuing collateral actions. "Entity" is statutorily defined to 
include a "governmental unit."83 While the Bankruptcy Code does 
allow governmental agencies to enforce police or regulatory powers, 
even in these instances agencies may apply for and enforce an in-
junction, and may seek entry of a "money judgment," but they may 
not enforce "money judgments. "84 The Sixth Circuit stated that the 
Bankruptcy Code indicated "a clear intent . . . to deny [governmen-
tal] units the power to collect money in their enforcement efforts. "85 
According to the Sixth Circuit, the Ohio court's appointment of a 
receiver "ordered that Kovacs turn over all his non-exempt assets 
to the receiver, and authorized the receiver to collect any sums of 
money that would become payable to Kovacs in the future. "86 There 
is, the Sixth Circuit said, "very little in substance to distinguish that 
order and a money judgment. "87 
In Kovacs II, the State of Ohio sought to determine whether 
Kovacs' clean-up obligation was dischargeable in bankruptcy.88 Like 
Kovacs I, this argument resolved itself into whether the money to 
be expended on cleaning up the toxic waste site constituted a "money 
judgment. "89 According to the bankruptcy court: "The parties have 
crystalized the issue here in simple fashion, [Ohio] stoutly insisting 
that the just identified affirmative obligation is not a monetary ob-
ligation, while [Kovacs] says it is."90 
f/J) Id. 
81/d. at 455-56 (quoting bankruptcy court). 
82 In Re Kovacs, 681 F.2d at 456. 
83 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
84 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982). E.g., In Re Tauscher, 7 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981l. 
85 681 F.2d at 456. 
86 Id. 
In Id. 
88 29 Bankr. at 818. 
89 Id. Kovacs I and Kovacs II thus presented essentially the identical issue in different 
contexts. In the latter case, if Ohio was successful, the state could levy on the wages of 
Kovacs after the bankruptcy proceeding closed or the automatic stay was no longer in effect. 
In the first case, a levy on wages by Ohio was prevented only during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. 
90 Id. 
1987] TOXIC DICE 355 
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the discharge of both "debts" 
and "claims. "91 "Debt" is defined as "liability on a claim. ''92 A "claim" 
is either: (1) a right to payment, or (2) a right to an equitable remedy 
for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to 
payment. 93 Thus, a right to an equitable remedy is a "claim" and a 
debt dischargeable in bankruptcy if, but only if, the equitable remedy 
is for breach of performance and the breach creates an alternative 
right to payment. 94 
The bankruptcy court agreed with Kovacs that the clean-up obli-
gation was indeed a money judgment, thus entitling Kovacs to a 
discharge in bankruptcy.95 The bankruptcy court's decision was up-
held by the district court and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.96 The 
State of Ohio, the Sixth Circuit held, was seeking a right to a 
payment. Further, the court said that the state, could not obtain 
performance of the equitable remedy (i.e., cleanup) from Kovacs 
because the receiver, and not Kovacs, possessed the waste site.97 
According to the court then, all that could be gained from Kovacs, 
and indeed all that was sought, was a money payment. 98 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Ohio argued that 
its action was not dischargeable because it was neither a right to 
payment nor a right to an equitable remedy also giving rise to an 
alternative right to payment. 99 Ohio did not have a right to payment 
because the requirements of the injunction that were at issue re-
91 11 U.S.C § 727(b) (1982). 
92 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). 
93 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). 
94 In KO'IJacs II, the state of Ohio also argued that only a breach of a commercial contract 
could give rise to a claim. The state reasoned that because Ohio's injunction arose from a 
breach of a statute, a claim had not been created. The Supreme Court summarily dismissed 
that argument, stating that Congress had intended a broad application of the word "claim" 
and no attempt had been made to limit the term only to contractual breaches. 469 U.S. at 
279. 
96 It is important to remember the two Kovacs cases. KO'IJacs 1,681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982) 
addressed the issue of an automatic stay. This Sixth Circuit decision was vacated and remanded 
on unrelated grounds by the Supreme Court. 459 U.S. 1167 (1983). Kovacs II, 717 F.2d 984 
(6th Cir. 1983) addressed the issue of whether the payment sought from Kovacs was dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case 
discussed in this article, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
96 In Re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 1983). 
In The court held that, effectively, Ohio was seeking an alternative right to payment. "Not 
surprisingly, Ohio encounters great difficulty in distinguishing its actions to date from an 
attempt to enforce an alternative right to payment." 717 F.2d at 987. 
98 "In reality, the only type of performance in which Ohio is now interested is a money 
payment to effectuate the Chem-Dyne cleanup." Id. 
99 469 U.S. at 279, 282 citi'f19 717 F.2d at 987. 
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quired Kovacs to perform certain acts rather than to pay money. 100 
The expenditure by Kovacs, Ohio said, was secondary or incidental 
to the cleanup of the property. 101 Neither did Ohio have a right to 
an equitable remedy also giving rise to an alternative right to pay-
ment. 102 An expenditure by Kovacs, the state said, would simply 
assist in the performance of the cleanup and would not be an alter-
native to it. Ohio claimed that Kovacs should merely be required to 
spend money in the process of performing an equitable remedy and 
that many equitable remedies require such an expenditure. 103 
In upholding Kovacs' right to have his hazardous waste clean-up 
obligation discharged in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court endorsed 
the Sixth Circuit's approach.104 The remedy sought by Ohio, the 
Court said, did in fact constitute a "money judgment. "105 As a result, 
the sought-after money was a "debt" dischargeable in bankruptcy. 106 
According to the Court, however, were it not for the receiver, the 
100 In contrast, the original state court injunction (see supra note 68) also required the 
payment of $75,000 to the State to compensate for injury to wildlife. Ohio conceded, however, 
that that was a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. 469 U.S. at 279. 
101 Ohio disputed the notion that the receivership dispossessed Kovacs of his interest in the 
property and stood in the shoes of Kovacs. Brief for Petitioner at 31-35, Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 
U.S. 274 (1985) (No. 83-1020). The purpose of the receiver, Ohio said, was simply to manage 
the property and to coordinate the efforts of the three parties interested in the property: the 
State of Ohio, Kovacs, and the generators of the wastes which were kept at Chern-Dyne. 
Brief for Petitioner at 34. 
Instead of preventing defendants from complying with injunctions, including the expenditure 
of funds in such compliance, Ohio said, the appointment of a receiver was designed to effectuate 
such compliance. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (to achieve 
desegregation of Boston schools); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (to 
alleviate unconscionable prison conditions); United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512, 
521 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (to cleanup water pollution). 
102 The Ohio statute is absolute on its face. It states that "[n]o person shall violate or fail to 
perform any duty imposed by sections 6111.01 to 6111.08 of the Revised Code, or violate any 
order, rule, or term or condition of a permit issued by the director of environmental protection 
pursuant to such sections." The statute proceeds to impose a mandatory duty upon the attorney 
general (using the term "shall") to "upon the written request of the director of environmental 
protection ... prosecute any person who violates, or who fails to perform any duty" imposed 
by these legal standards. The statute finally imposes a mandatory duty upon the attorney 
general (again using the term "shall") to, "upon written request of the director of environ-
mental protection . . . bring an action for an injunction against any person violating or 
threatening to violate" any of these legal standards. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.07. 
103 See infra notes 147-154 and 162-167 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, perhaps stated the principle 
best: " . . . we cannot ignore the fundamental fact that, in contemporary times, almost 
everything costs something. An injunction which does not compel some expenditure or loss 
of monies may often be an effective nullity." 733 F.2d 267,278 (3d Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). 
104 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985). 
106 [d. at 285. 
106 [d. at 279, 283. 
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State of Ohio might have prevailed. 107 Through the receiver, the 
state possessed Kovacs' property and assets. 108 Having been dispos-
sessed of his property, Kovacs no longer had control of the property 
subject to the environmental dispute. 109 The Court noted that Kovacs 
was "disabled by the receivership from personally taking charge of 
and carrying out the removal of wastes from the property. "110 As a 
result, the Court held, Kovacs' post-bankruptcy income was all that 
Ohio could possibly have hoped to gain from its state court action 
and, in fact, the "only performance sought from Kovacs was the 
payment of money. "lll This, the Court indicated, strengthened the 
argument that Ohio's request was a "debt," or a "liability on a claim," 
against which the income would be applied. 112 
Several factors, however, support the conclusion that payment by 
Kovacs was not an alternative to cleanup of the dump site and, 
accordingly, was not a claim subject to discharge. First, the original 
injunctions were not conditional. The state ordered Kovacs to re-
move the hazardous chemicals and did not give him the choice of 
making a monetary payment instead.113 Second, no Ohio law pro-
vided that a payment to the state treasury could be considered 
adequate performance of an order to clean up a toxic dump. The 
state statutory framework did not provide an owner or operator of 
a toxic waste site with an "alternative right to payment" in lieu of 
compliance with the statutory requirements. As a result, under the 
statutory scheme, Ohio argued, no "claim" existed as defined by the 
Bankruptcy Code. 114 
By allowing discharge in Kovacs, the Court seems to have defied 
the expressed intent of Congress that to be eligible for discharge, 
equitable remedies must have alternative rights to payment. The 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that requiring 
an alternative right to payment was a clear congressional policy 
choice. In the original version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, "claim" 
107 I d. at 282-83. 
108Id. 
109 Id. Although not analyzed on these grounds in this article, the Supreme Court decision 
seems subject to criticism on the grounds that it misapplied state law regarding receiverships. 
If, under state law, Kovacs was not considered to have been "dispossessed" of his property 
by the receiver, the Supreme Court analysis fails. 
110 469 U.S. at 283. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. 
113 See In Re Kovacs, 681 F.2d at 454 (noting that the injunctions ordered Kovacs to 
cooperate with the receiver in cleaning up the waste). 
114 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
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included a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance 
if such breach does not give rise to a right of payment .... "115 After 
other definitions were proposed, the current wording was eventually 
enacted. The sponsor's remarks explaining the definition of a claim 
indicated that the language was intended, in those instances where 
the existence of a monetary payment and an equitable remedy stood 
on equal footing, to force an "election" of the monetary remedy; that 
remedy would then unquestionably fall within the definition of 
"claim. "116 
Ignoring this legislative history and instead relying on her own 
policy analysis, Supreme Court Justice O'Connor, in a special con-
curring opinion, said the finding that the clean-up order was a "lia-
bility on a claim" within the meaning of section 101(4) avoids the 
potentially adverse consequences for a state's enforcement of an 
environmental order when the debtor is a corporation, rather than 
an individual. 1l7 In liquidation proceedings under chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, Justice O'Connor said, a trustee's distribution of 
the bankrupt's property is limited to creditors holding "claims. "118 
Because the corporation ceases to exist, there are no post-bank-
ruptcy earnings to use in fulfilling a clean-up order. As a result, 
Justice O'Connor concluded, a state's "claim" to the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy assets could be the state's only chance to recover any of 
the debtor's estate. 119 
2. The Penn Terra Comparison 
In the case of Penn Terra v. Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources,120 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals faced a 
situation much like Kovacs but reached an opposite result. In Penn 
Terra, the court looked at a debtor corporation that operated coal 
surface mines in western Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's state envi-
ronmental protection agency, the Department of Environmental Re-
115 RESNICK & WYPYSKI, supra note 35, at vol. 12, doc. 41, p.3 (emphasis added). 
116 The sponsor stated: "'[This] is intended to cause the liquidation or estimation of contingent 
rights of payment for which there may be an alternative equitable remedy with the result 
that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to being discharged in bankruptcy.'" 469 U.S. 
at 280. 
117Id. at 286. 
118Id. 
119Id. Any part of the state's claim not fulfilled by distribution of the estate would then be 
subject to discharge. See supra notes 42-46 (liquidation) and 63-64 (reorganization) and 
accompanying text. 
120 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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sources (DER), found the company in violation of a number of state 
environmental statutes. 121 
In 1981, the DER and Penn Terra's president entered into a 
consent order that would have brought Penn Terra into compliance 
with the state laws. The consent decree listed the violations and 
established a schedule for Penn Terra's corrective measures. 122 After 
the consent decree was entered into, Penn Terra filed for liquidation 
under chapter 7. 123 When Penn Terra subsequently failed to comply 
with the consent decree, the DER filed an enforcement action in 
state court. l24 One month later, Penn Terra sought protection from 
that state court action, arguing that because the company had pre-
viously petitioned for bankruptcy, it was entitled to an automatic 
stay of all collateral court proceedings. 125 The State of Pennsylvania 
replied that the proceedings fell within the exception for govern-
mental agencies acting pursuant to state police powers. 126 The bank-
ruptcy court enjoined the state court proceedings and the federal 
district court affirmed. 127 
In reversing the bankruptcy and district court injunctions,128 the 
Third Circuit said the Bankruptcy Code should be read "so as to 
leave to the states as much of their police power as a fair reading of 
the statute allows. "129 The court noted the importance of state en-
vironmental protection statutes, stating that "the police power of 
the several states embodies the main bulwark of protection by which 
they carry out their responsibilities to the People; its abrogation is 
therefore a serious matter. "130 
The Penn Terra court departed from the Sixth Circuit Kovacs 
analysis, which held that the state's requested remedy "in essence 
amounted to a money judgment. "131 Instead, Penn Terra relied upon 
121 Pennsylvania claimed violation of the Penn. Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1983) and of the Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining 
Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1396.1-.23 (Purdon 1966 & Supp. 1983). DER 
served Penn Terra with 36 citations, none of which the corporation contested. 733 F.2d at 269 
n.1. 
122 733 F.2d at 269. 
123 I d. at 270. 
1241d. 
1251d. The consent decree was filed in 1981. The bankruptcy was filed on March 15, 1982; 
the enforcement action was filed on April 14, 1982; the action seeking bankruptcy protection 
was filed on May 28, 1982. ld. 
1261d. citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
1271d. The bankruptcy court relied on the "obvious insolvency" of Penn Terra. ld. 
128 ld. at 279. 
129 I d. at 273. 
130ld. 
131 ld. at 277. "We find, however, that the definition of 'money judgment' implied in Kovacs 
--------- --~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
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a more traditional legal definition. A "money judgment," the Third 
Circuit said, "is an order entered by the court or by the clerk, after 
a verdict has been rendered for plaintiff, which adjudges that the 
defendant should pay a sum of money to the plaintiff. "132 The court 
went on to find that the state court action "was neither in form nor 
substance the type of remedy traditionally associated with the con-
ventional money judgment."133 According to the Third Circuit, the 
court action was not intended to provide compensation for past 
injuries nor was it reducible to a sum certain; no monies were sought 
by the Commonwealth as a creditor or obligee. The Commonwealth 
was not seeking a traditional form of damages in tort or contract. 134 
The court said that, rather than requesting a "judgment" which 
would "seek compensation for past damages," the state's sanction 
"was meant to prevent future harm to, and to restore, the environ-
ment. "135 It concluded by positing that "were we to find that any 
order which requires the expenditure of money is a 'money judg-
ment,' then the exception to section 362 for government police action, 
which should be construed broadly, would instead be narrowed into 
virtual non-existence. "136 
The critical difference between Kovacs and Penn Terra was the 
presence of the receiver. Because of the receiver in Kovacs, the 
Supreme Court held that the expenditure of money sought by the 
State of Ohio was essentially a money judgment that was in turn a 
"claim" dischargeable in bankruptcy.137 Two different lines of anal-
ysis lead to the conclusion that this is not an appropriate distinction. 
a. Overreaching Analysis 
The Kovacs decision presents the potential for serious abuse. Ap-
plying the thesis articulated in Kovacs to Penn Terra shows how the 
doctrine can backfire. One can argue that Kovacs stands for the 
proposition that when, due to the disability of a debtor, all that the 
state is seeking is the payment of funds, the relief requested is "in 
essence" a money judgment. In Kovacs, the debtor's disability was 
created by the appointment of the receiver in state court. Because 
... is unduly broad." [d. (referring to the Circuit Court decision). This Penn Terra Circuit 
Court decision, of course, pre-dates the Supreme Court Kovacs decision. 
132 [d. at 275. 
133 [d. at 278. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. at 277-78. 
137 469 U.S. at 283. 
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of that receiver, the Supreme Court held, Kovacs was "disabled ... 
from personally taking charge of and carrying out the removal of 
wastes from the property. "138 As a result, Kovacs' post-bankruptcy 
income was all that Ohio could possibly have hoped to gain from its 
state court action and, in fact, the "only performance sought from 
Kovacs was the payment of money. "139 
A similar argument could have been made in Penn Terra, the only 
distinction being what element disabled the debtor. In Penn Terra, 
the circuit court noted that the claimed assets of the debtor corpo-
ration totalled only $14,000, with the cost of the sought after clean-
up alone substantially exceeding that amount. 140 When other debts 
were considered, according to the court, the debtor's total liability 
was roughly $660,000. 141 Indeed, the bankruptcy court labelled the 
equitable relief sought by the state as "meaningless. "142 
Language identical to the Kovacs holding could thus be substituted 
into a hypothetical Penn Terra appeal. Because of the significant 
disparity between the cost of the cleanup and the available assets, 
the debtor would be viewed as "disabled ... from personally taking 
charge of and carrying out the removal of wastes from the prop-
erty."143 As a result, Penn Terra's post-bankruptcy income, what 
there was of it, would be all that Pennsylvania could possibly hope 
to gain from its state court action. Under the Kovacs reasoning, 
because the equitable relief was expressly labelled by the court as 
"meaningless," the only performance actually sought from Penn 
Terra would be the payment of money. 144 
Kovacs articulates the principle that any expenditure of funds by 
a bankrupt debtor is in essence a money judgment when the debtor 
is "disabled from personally taking charge and carrying out the 
removal of wastes from the property." A disability, however, can be 
caused by many factors. In Kovacs, the disability was the "disposs-
ession" of Kovacs' property by the receiver; in Penn Terra, the 
disability was due to the great disparity between the costs of clean-
138 [d. 
139 [d. 
140 Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 270. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. 
143 In Re Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283. 
144 Indeed, in language close to the Supreme Court's Kovacs holding, the district court 
decision noted that: "[iJn the instant case, although the DER's action was ostensibly under-
taken to enforce state environmental laws, the effect of the action, in light of the disparity 
between the costs and funds available to do the reclamation work, was to collect a money 
judgment against Penn Terra .... " 733 F.2d at 270 (quoting District Court). 
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up and the assets of the bankrupt. Because by definition, most if not 
all bankrupt debtors could argue disability akin to the Penn Terra 
hypothetical outlined, the Kovacs doctrine is a dangerous principle 
which the courts should not allow to prevail. 
b. Inconsistent Doctrine 
Aside from the ominous policy implications of the decision, in 
Kovacs, the Supreme Court seems to have broken from its tradi-
tional analysis of what is "in essence a money judgment. "145 The 
phrase is not unique to the Kovacs litigation and the Supreme Court 
could have looked to current state sovereign immunity litigation for 
guidance. 146 The eleventh amendment to the federal Constitution 
provides that a state may not be sued, without its consent, by one 
of its citizens or by the citizens of another state. 147 The apparent 
dictates of the eleventh amendment have been eroded over the 
years. The rule has evolved to bar only suits by private parties 
seeking to impose a liability that must be paid from public funds in 
the state treasury.148 So too are suits against individual public offi-
cials barred when they are "in essence . . . for the recovery of money 
from the state . . . . "149 
Building upon the Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte Young,150 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was construed to allow prospec-
tive relief against the states even when such relief would require 
the expenditure of state funds. 151 Retroactive relief, however, was 
nevertheless prohibited as was prospective relief when it in essence 
145 See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and its progeny. 
146 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
147 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946). 
148 323 U.S. at 464. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 
U.S. 459, 464 (1945). 
149 In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court first approved the use of litigation against the 
states that sought injunctive relief. To permit such relief, the Court held, was necessary to 
enforce the supremacy of federal law. 209 U.S. at 149-68. 
150 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). A remedy requiring the expenditure 
of state revenues was permissable under the eleventh amendment, Milliken held, if the 
petitioners sought "payment of state funds . . . as a necessary consequence of compliance in 
the future with a substantive federal-question determination .... " 433 U.S. at 289 (citing 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)); accord, Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277, 285 
(6th Cir. 1984). 
151 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Retroactive relief involving the payment of funds was allowed against 
cities in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Recently, however, 
the Supreme Court has expressly held that notwithstanding Monell's holding regarding cities, 
Edelman remains intact for states. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (addressing Michigan 
AFDC payments). 
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constituted a money judgment against the state. One of the leading 
decisions articulating this doctrine is Edelman v. Jordan.152 
In Edelman, petitioners challenged the manner in which Illinois 
administered the federal Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled 
(AABD) program.153 Petitioners charged that Illinois was not pro-
cessing applications for AABD assistance within the time dictated 
by federal law and that the state was authorizing grants to commence 
only with the month in which an application was approved rather 
than including prior eligibility months to which an applicant was 
entitled under federal law. Petitioners requested the court to direct 
the state to provide appropriate benefits in the future as well as to 
award "all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld. "154 
The Supreme Court approved the equitable relief in Edelman, 
holding that the expenditure of funds on future compliance would 
have "an ancillary effect on the state treasury [which] is a permis-
sible and often an inevitable consequence .... "155 The Court how-
ever, disapproved the retroactive monetary award in Edelman. The 
Court held: 
While the Court of Appeals described this retroactive award of 
monetary relief as a form of 'equitable restitution,' it is in prac-
tical effect indistinguishable in many respects from an award of 
damages against the State. 156 
The Court's disapproval of this monetary award did not rest simply 
on the fact that the debt would "to a virtual certainty be paid from 
state funds .... "157 Instead, the Court adopted a functional test. 
The purpose of the retroactive award, the Court held, was to com-
pensate the litigant for "a monetary loss resulting from a past breach 
of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials. "158 
The Supreme Court in Edelman articulated three different tests 
for when relief that appeared on its face to be equitable was to be 
deemed "in essence a money judgment:" (1) ifit sought compensation 
152 415 u.s. at 653. 
153 [d. at 655-56. 
154 [d. at 668. A subsequent federal district court decision has construed the tenn "ancillary," 
which the Supreme Court has used only once again, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 
(1979). Moore v. Miller, 612 F. Supp. 952, 956 (D. Ill. 1985). 
155 [d. 
156 [d.; accord, Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d at 286 (rejecting argument that an act that 
"will lead inexorably to the payment of state funds . . . in effect, amounts to a monetary 
award"). 
157 [d. 
158 [d. at 658. 
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for "a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty;"159 
(2) if it constituted "an accrued monetary liability;"160 and (3) if it 
was retroactive not prospective in nature. 161 In addition, according 
to one of the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements, the Edel-
man "money judgment" language does not apply to "relief that 
serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law 
"162 
The lower courts in sovereign immunity litigation have further 
developed the distinction between funds sought to be spent on pro-
spective injunctive relief and those spent on retroactive damages. 
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, for example, picked 
up on the Edelman language,163 noting that whether the grant of 
relief is impermissible retroactive relief or permissible prospective 
relief turns on whether such relief respectively represents an "ac-
crued monetary liability" or an expenditure to ensure future com-
pliance with federal law. 164 
The Fourth Circuit decision in Reed v. Health and Human 
Services165 exemplifies this particular distinction. In Reed, the 
Fourth Circuit refused to order retroactive relief when petitioners 
challenged Virginia's treatment of compensation for personal injuries 
as income in making AFDC eligibility determinations. The court 
held that the retroactive payment of benefits sought by petitioners: 
"cannot be seen as an adjunct of the court ordered prospective relief, 
but could only constitute redress for past violations of federal law. 
As such, the award would be indistinguishable from damages. "166 If 
the expenditure is to compel the defendant to cease actions in vio-
lation of the law, according to these cases, it would not constitute a 
money judgment. The "key," according to the Eighth Circuit, "is 
whether [the remedy] requires payment of . . . funds, not as a 
necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive 
federal question determination, but as a form of compensation. "167 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, if a payment is a necessary 
159 [d. at 664. 
160 [d. at 664. See also Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1985). 
161 Papasan v. Allain, _ U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2940 (1986). 
162 415 U.S. at 664. 
163 Maryland Department of Hum. Res. v. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 
1441, 1448, n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
164 774 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1985). 
165 [d. at 1276. 
166 Slaughter v. Levine, 801 F.2d 288, 300 (8th Cir. 1986), citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668. 
167 Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 960-63 (lith Cir. 1985). 
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consequence of compliance, it is merely ancillary to the equitable 
remedy. 168 
It is not at all clear why the Supreme Court in Kovacs moved 
away from this doctrine on when equitable relief under federal law 
is "in essence a money judgment." At least one circuit court, the 
Third Circuit in Penn Terra, was moving down the same road in the 
bankruptcy context. In Penn Terra, the Third Circuit held that the 
hazardous waste clean-up obligation of an industry was not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy.169 The court found that the cleanup in-
volved no compensation for "a past breach of a legal duty" on the 
part of the defendants. 17o Indeed, the Penn Terra court expressly 
distinguished between funds spent to compensate for past actions 
and funds spent to assure future compliance. The Penn Terra court 
relied on the fact that rather than requesting a "judgment" that 
would "seek compensation for past damages," the state sought a 
sanction that "was meant to prevent future harm to, and to restore, 
the environment."l7l 
The legal doctrine in Edelman and Penn Terra is thus similar 
even though the cases were resolved differently on the facts. The 
Edelman court expressly found that the retroactive award of AFDC 
benefits was to compensate the litigants for "a monetary loss result-
ing from a past breach of a legal duty .... "172 In contrast, the Penn 
Terra court expressly found that "no monies were sought by the 
Commonwealth as a creditor or obligee. The Commonwealth was 
not seeking a traditional form of damages in tort or contract."173 
Application of the same reasoning to Kovacs would have led to a 
decision consistent with Penn Terra. In Kovacs, the monetary award 
sought by Ohio was an "adjunct of the court ordered prospective 
relief," (i. e., the cleanup). 174 The expenditure of money by Kovacs 
would have been a "necessary consequence of compliance in the 
future."175 The clean-up expenditure did not constitute an "accrued 
monetary liabilitY,"176 nor did it constitute a "redress for past vio-
lations of [the] law."I77 Based on these past legal definitions of when 
168 See supra notes 120-137 and accompanying text. 
169 733 F.2d at 278. 
170 [d. 
171 415 U.S. at 668. 
172 733 F.2d at 278. 
173 See, e.g., 774 F.2d at 1276. 
174 801 F.2d at 300. 
175 415 U.S. at 664, 668; accord, 763 F.2d at 1448, n.2. 
176 774 F.2d 1276. 
177 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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the expenditures of equitable funds represented "in essence a money 
judgment," the Supreme Court should have reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit's Kovacs decision. The failure of the Supreme Court to do so 
was not only bad policy, but bad law as well. 
3. Impact on State Enforcement 
Notwithstanding the ominous repercussions of the Kovacs deci-
sion, Justice O'Connor said the resolution of that case was not "hos-
tile to state enforcement of environmentallaws."17s Justice O'Connor, 
in particular, took pains to assert that governments wishing to force 
bankrupt petitioners' compliance with environmental regulations still 
have multiple options. 179 
Perhaps the most readily available enforcement mechanism is in-
junctive relief. Not only are injunctions against continuing pollution 
and dumping at an industrial waste site unaffected by personal bank-
ruptcy, but environmental injunctions which relate to ongoing activ-
ities are not stayed by corporate bankruptcy. This principle holds 
even though such injunctions may require the expenditure of funds. 
Injunctive relief requiring the expenditure of funds has been used 
in diverse situations. The State of Pennsylvania, for example, has 
been awarded injunctive relief under three different environmental 
statutes against certain strip mining. ISO Also by injunction, Puerto 
Rico has been permitted to enforce the federal Clean Air Act against 
a corporate chapter 11 bankrupt. lSI In this case, the money issue 
was particularly clear-cut. The Puerto Rico Environmental Quality 
Board sought to enforce air pollution standards against a quarry. 
The enforcement measures included the required installation of dust 
control equipment costing $323,000.lS2 Notwithstanding the debtor's 
chapter 11 bankruptcy, the district court refused to stay the Board's 
cease and desist order directing an end to the quarry's pollution 
including, in lieu of closure of the facility, installation of the dust 
control equipment. 183 
In addition to court action prohibiting designated activity, various 
sanctions based upon violations of environmental statutes may be 
imposed against individuals, trustees and similarly situated entities 
178 See id. 
179 Commonwealth-Dept. of Env. Res. v. Peggs Run Coal Company, 423 A.2d 765 (1980). 
180 In the Matter of Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979). 
181 [d. at 1334. 
182 [d. at 1340. 
183 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274, 284. 
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notwithstanding the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings. The Bank-
ruptcy Code, for example, does not shield violators from criminal 
prosecutions. l84 Moreover, the Code expressly prevents the dis-
charge of fines or monetary penalties imposed, prior to bankruptcy, 
for violation of state laws. 185 
Aside from these enforcement mechanisms created by federal law, 
it is state law, Justice O'Connor said, that largely classifies creditors' 
interests in a bankrupt's assets. 186 State legislatures, in other words, 
could amend their statutes to make environmental judgments either 
statutory liens or secured claims. 187 In fact, the State of Iowa did 
precisely that. In Iowa, a person having control over a hazardous 
substance is strictly liable for, among other things, the "reasonable 
clean-up costs incurred by the state as a result of the failure of the 
person to clean up a hazardous substance involved in a hazardous 
condition caused by the person. "188 Strict liability extends, as well, 
to "the reasonable damages to the state for the injury to, destruction 
of, or loss of natural resources resulting from a hazardous condition" 
caused by such a person. 189 
In 1986, after the Kovacs decision, the Iowa legislature modified 
the rights of the state in relation to bankrupt owners of abandoned 
or uncontrolled disposal sites. 190 According to that legislation, liabil-
ity to the state for the articulated costs "is a debt to the state. "191 
Moreover, the new Iowa legislation provided that, with the exception 
of single and multi-family residential property, such a debt consti-
tutes "a lien on real property," which is dissolved only if the debt is 
"paid or legally abated. "192 To provide the state with early warning 
of possible future financial problems, "[i]mmediately upon the incur-
rence of any liability to the state under this [statute]," the debtor is 
to submit "a report consisting of documentation of the debtor's lia-
bilities and assets" and is to continue such reporting "for the life of 
the debt. "193 
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 6523(a)(7) (1982). 
185 See also Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 
48, 54 (1982). 
186 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 286. 
187 25 IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.392 (1987). 
188 [d. 
189 [d. at §§ 455B.396, et seq. 
190 [d. at § 455B.396. 
191 [d. 
192 [d. at 455B.397. 
193 42 U. S. C. § 9607(1) (Supp. 1987). These arise at the time which is the latter of the time 
costs are first incurred under the statute or the time that the affected person is provided 
specified written notice of potential liability. [d. at § 9607(1), (2). 
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In addition to the various state statutes, in 1986, Congress 
amended CERCLA to create a statutory lien for "all costs and 
damages for which a person is liable to the United States" under 
that statute. 194 The CERCLA lien attaches to all real property and 
rights to such property that belong to the person subject to CER-
CLA and are subject to, or affected by, a removal or remedial 
action. 195 
As a result of this legislation, it seems possible to take certain 
clean-up obligations out of the Kovacs analysis. 196 While proceedings 
to collect the obligation would be stayed,197 the debt itself, as secured 
by the statutory lien, would not be subject to discharge. Because 
property on which a state holds a lien does not become part of the 
debtor's estate, a lien on an allowable claim198 is not "discharged" in 
bankruptcy. Section 541 generally limits property of the estate to 
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property. "199 A lien 
is considered a current property interest of the creditor and not 
simply a claim on the property of the debtor. 
Several limitations exist, however, on the protections offered by 
a statutory lien. First, a statutory lien is narrowly defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code. A statutory lien is a "lien arising solely by force 
of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions .... "200 A 
194 Because of the conjunction in the federal statute, the lien provision of this law is sub-
stantively weaker in providing bankruptcy protections than the corresponding Iowa, New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts statutes. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the value of the lien is 
secured only to the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in the property. If one assumes 
that little value inheres in a toxic waste disposal site wherein clean-up problems exist, see 
infra note 202 and accompanying text, the limitation of the lien only to that property "subject 
to or affected by a removal or remedial action" is a major loophole in securing liability against 
bankruptcy. For a general discussion of these state "super lien" statutes, see generally Note, 
Priority Lien Statutes: The State's Answer to Bankrupt Hazardous Waste Generators, 31 
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 373 (1987). 
195 Several states have enacted similar legislation. New Hampshire, for example, has leg-
islation similar to Iowa. N.H. RSA, § 147-B: 10, et seq. (1986 Supp.). That state created a 
statutory lien "upon the business revenues and all real and personal property of any person 
subject to liability" under its toxic waste clean-up statute. § 147-B: 1O-b, I (1986 Supp.). So, 
too, has Massachusetts legislatively declared that any debt, with interest, incurred under its 
toxic waste liability statute "shall constitute a lien on all property" owned by persons liable 
under the act. M.G.C.A., § 21E.13 (1986 Supp.). 
196 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). 
197 A number of situations might exist where a lien would not be "allowable." Examples 
include: (1) if it did not meet the definition of a "lien" per section 101(28) of the Code; (2) if it 
did not meet the definition of a "statutory lien" per section 101(39) of the Code; (3) if the 
statutory lien falls within the restrictions of section 545 of the Code; or (4) if the obligation 
was fraudulent per section 548 of the Code. 
198 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). 
199 11 U.S.C. § 101(39). 
200 In Re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 623 (W.D. La. 1968), afl'd 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968); 
NAPCO Graphic Arts, Inc., v. Ludwig, 51 Bankr. 757, 760-61 (E.D. Wis. 1985). 
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statutory lien is only one that arises automatically, and is not based 
on an agreement to give a lien or on judicial action. 201 A statutory 
lien does not include judicial liens and security interests, even if 
provided for in a statute or dependent on a statute and even if made 
fully effective by a statute. 202 Second, a creditor's claim is generally 
secured by the lien only to the extent of the value of the creditor's 
interest in the property; the value of the claim beyond the value of 
the creditor's interest in the property is considered an unsecured 
claim.203 Finally, section 545 of the Code, as limited by section 546, 
outlines circumstances in which statutory liens can be avoided alto-
gether.204 
B. The Case of Midlantic 
In contrast to the outcome in Kovacs is the 1986 Supreme Court 
decision in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection.205 In Midlantic, the Court considered 
whether a bankrupt corporation could avoid its obligation to cleanup 
hazardous waste sites by abandoning those sites pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Code. In Midlantic, the Supreme Court majority held 
that given the public policy inherent in controlling toxic wastes, 
historic limitations on the abandonment powers were not to be ig-
nored. 206 In contrast, the Midlantic dissent urged that the statutory 
language permitting abandonment was "absolute in its terms" and 
"limited only by considerations of the property's value to the es-
tate."207 The Bankruptcy Code, the dissent said, does not allow for 
the consideration of external policies such as environmental protec-
tion. 208 
In 1981, Quanta Resources Corporation, a waste oil processor, 
filed for a chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy.209 The trustee appointed 
to handle the bankruptcy filed a notice of intention to abandon prop-
201 11 u.s.c. § 101(39) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
202 11 u.s.c. § 506(a) (1982). 
203 See generally Schneyer, Statutory Liens Under the New Bankruptcy Code-Some Prob-
lems Remain, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1981). 
204 54 U.S.L.W. 4138 (Jan. 27, 1986). 
205 [d. at 4140-42. 
206 [d. at 4142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
207 [d. at 4144. 
208 The next month, the corporation converted the proceeding to one of liquidation pursuant 
to chapter 7. [d. at 4139. 
209 The corporation undertook a number of separate abandonments. Initially, it sought only 
to abandon the real property at the two facilities, Edgewater and Long Island. Subsequently, 
however, it sought also to abandon its personal property, which was comprised of the contam-
inated oil itself, at the Edgewater facility. [d. 
370 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:345 
erty held by Quanta Resources at its two processing facilities, one 
in Long Island City, N ew York and one in Edgewater, New Jersey. 210 
At the time of the notice, there were on-site storage tanks containing 
at least 470,000 gallons of fuel contaminated with polychlorinated 
byphenyls (PCBs).211 Because the mortgages on the facility's real 
property exceeded the property's value, the estimated cost of dis-
posing of the waste oil plainly rendered the property a net burden 
to the estate. 212 The trustee attempted to sell the property and filed 
its notice of abandonment only upon finding an inability to do SO.213 
The Code provides for abandonment of "assets"214 when the 
trustee cannot expect to sell the property for a price sufficiently in 
excess of encumbrances to offset the costs of administration. 215 This 
doctrine is intended to help expeditiously reduce the debtor's prop-
erty to money for equitable distribution to creditors. 216 
The City of New York opposed the abandonment proposed by the 
corporate bankrupt in Midlantic. New York claimed that the chem-
icals that constituted the affected assets represented a safety hazard 
which violated state environmental statutes.217 N ew York argued 
that the abandonment would itself violate both state and local law. 
The action, the city said, would revest title in the contaminated oil, 
subject to liens, in Quanta. 218 Quanta, however, having lost title to 
all of its other assets in favor of the estate upon commencement of 
210 Of this waste, 400,000 gallons were at the Edgewater facility with an additional 70,000 
gallons at Long Island. 54 U.S.L. W. at 4139 n.3. PCBs have been legislatively detennined to 
be toxic, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1982), and detailed rules have been promulgated to govern their 
manufacturing, processing, distribution and use. See 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1986). 
211 54 U.S.L.W. at 4139. 
212 [d. 
213 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). Abandoned property reverts from the trustee to the person 
or entity having possessory interest. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284 n.12. 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, 554.01 (15th ed. 1985). 
214 Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930). 
215 The city and state relied upon 28 U.S.C. section 959(b) (1979) which requires a trustee 
to "manage and operate" property of a bankrupt's estate "according to the requirements of 
the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated." 54 U.S.L. W. at 4139. The city 
urged that Quanta Resources was violating N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 27-0900 to 27-0923 
(McKinney Supp. 1982); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE Tit. 6, Sec. 366.4(e) (1982); New York, N.Y. 
ADMIN. CODE § 019-050.0; 739 F.2d at 913. 
216 Abandonment by a trustee of an asset immediately revests title to that asset in the 
bankrupt. In Re Motley, 10 Bankr. 141, 145 (M.D. Ga. 1981); accord, In Re Polumbo, 271 F. 
Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Va. 1967). Title to the property is regarded as the bankrupt's just as if 
he had never been in bankruptcy. The title stands as it was just before the bankruptcy filing. 
In Re Tarpley, 4 Bankr. 145, 146 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); accord, Schram v. Tobias, 40 F. Supp. 
470, 472 (E.D. Mich. 1941). 
217 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
218 In the Matter of Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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the bankruptcy proceeding,219 would be unable to do anything with 
respect to the storage site. The city concluded that, as a result, the 
abandonment itself would constitute "disposal" of the hazardous 
wastes pursuant to state law. 220 
In addition, New York argued that abandonment of the facility in 
its then state of disrepair-itself irremediable by Quanta-would 
create a continuing violation of state and local hazardous waste 
storage laws. 221 After abandonment, the trustee would not be re-
quired to take "even relatively minor steps to reduce imminent 
danger," such as providing security fencing, drainage and diking 
repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive 
agents. 222 The trustee's abandonment at both sites223 "aggravated 
already existing dangers by halting security measures that pre-
vented public entry, vandalism and fire. "224 
The City of N ew York lost in both the bankruptcy court and the 
district court.225 The Third Circuit, however, reversed , 226 holding: 
the goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation 
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business even if the con-
tinued operation of the business would be thwarted by applying 
state laws . . . .227 
Stating that "equitable principles are applicable in determining 
whether a trustee may abandon property in contravention of state 
law," the Third Circuit found that the action requested "clearly 
contravened applicable law, and did so not merely technically, but 
with severely deleterious implications for the public safety. "228 
No federal statute insulates current possessors of dangerous re-
sources from relevant environmental protection requirements. The 
federal bankruptcy statute requires a trustee holding assets of an 
219 [d. 
220 54 U.S.L.W. at 4139 n.3. 
221 As noted above, Quanta sought to abandon three types of property: (1) real property at 
its Edgewater, New Jersey facility; (2) real property at its Long Island, New York facility; 
and (3) personal property, consisting of its contaminated oil, at the New Jersey site. See supra 
note 209. 
222 54 U.S.L.W. 4139 n.3. 
223 Matter of Quanta, 739 F.2d at 912. 
224 [d. at 923; see also In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984) (New 
Jersey's appeal). 
225 Matter of Quanta, 739 F.2d at 919. 
226 [d. at 921. 
227 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982). 
228 [d. 
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insolvent corporation to "manage and operate its property ... ac-
cording to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which 
such property is located."229 A bankruptcy trustee, the statute dic-
tates, must manage its property "in the same manner that the owner 
or possessor would be bound to do if in possession thereof. "230 
The Circuit Court in Midlantic weighed the policy advanced by 
the bankruptcy statute against these environmental interests. The 
Code seeks to preserve as much of the estate as possible for distri-
bution to creditors. 231 Compliance, however, with the hazardous 
waste disposal statutes in the first place, the Circuit Court said, 
would have required the substantial expenditure of funds. 232 Thus if 
Midlantic had obeyed the law, there would have been, in the first 
instance, a "depleting [of] the assets of the estate available for 
distribution to creditors .... "233 In other words, the court concluded 
that there was no reason in law or policy to allow for the creditors 
of the estate to be enriched because of the pre-bankruptcy unlawful 
actions of the debtor. By denying permission to abandon the assets, 
the creditors would only be placed in the position in which they 
would have been had no unlawful activity taken place. 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit in Midlan-
tiC.234 The Court held that the bankruptcy "abandonment power" has 
always been subject to a "judicially developed doctrine intended to 
protect legitimate state or federal interests. "235 The Court noted that 
strict limitations have been placed on abandonment, particularly 
when questions of the public's health and safety were at issue.236 
Thus, a trustee could not abandon barges that would have consti-
tuted an obstruction in a navigable waterway;237 an insolvent transit 
company could not cease operation of a branch rail line in contra-
vention of state law;238 and a debtor public utility, while permitted 
to abandon an unexpired lease, was first required to seal its under-
ground steam lines. 239 
229 Matter of Quanta, 739 F.2d at 921. 
230 [d. at 913. 
231 [d. at 921. 
232 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 54 
U.S.L.W. 4138 (1986). 
233 [d. at 4140. 
234 See id. 
235 Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952), aff'g In Re Eastern Transp. Co., 
102 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1952). 
236 In Re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942), cen. denied, 317 U.S. 683 
(1942). 
237 In Re Lewis Jones, 1 B.C.D. 277 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1974). 
238 54 U.S.L.W. at 4140. 
239 [d. at 4140-41. 
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The Midlantic Court cited Kovacs for the proposition that bank-
ruptcy trustees do not have carte blanche authority to ignore non-
bankruptcy laws.240 Moreover, the Midlantic Court cited several 
other examples of the application of this doctrine. For example, the 
automatic stay provision, one of the "fundamental debtor protections 
provided by the bankruptcy laws,"241 the Court said, still allows a 
governmental unit to sue a debtor to "prevent violation of . . . en-
vironmental protection . . . safety or similar police or regulatory 
laws .... "242 In addition, the Code requires a trustee, who is man-
aging an estate rather than liquidating it, to operate the property 
in her possession according to the requirements of all valid state 
laws. 243 
These restrictions on the operation of the abandonment provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code, according to the Supreme Court, were first 
established judicially and only subsequently codified.244 The Midlan-
tic Court held that particularly given the continuing concern by 
Congress in toxic waste disposal, it was unwilling to presume that 
by expressly recognizing the abandonment restrictions in statute, 
Congress implicitly overturned such long-standing restrictions on 
the common-law abandonment power. 245 
240 [d. at 4141 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595). 
241 [d. 
242 See id. at 4140. 
243 [d. 
244 U.S. v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1177 (D.N.H. 1982). 
The status of Manville remains uncertain today. The reorganization involves assessing and 
meshing the competing interests of creditors, stockholders and the corporate board of direc-
tors. In Re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). "The challenge all the 
[interest groups] have faced is to fashion a [reorganization] plan that will preserve Manville's 
capacity to generate enough revenue to pay existing creditors, to cover its liabilities to present 
and future tort claimants where liability is certain though its precise extent is unknown, and 
to satisfy Manville's shareholders." [d. at 62. In August, 1985, Manville and the representa-
tives of the tort claimants "formulat[ed] a plan that would earmark billions of dollars for 
payment to present and future asbestosis victims as well as to others damaged by the asbestos 
products that Manville once manufactured and sold." [d. Noting that this plan may dilute 
equity by 90 percent, the committee of shareholders sought to compel a shareholder meeting 
the acknowledged purpose of which was to replace Manville directors so as to reconsider 
SUbmitting the plan. [d. at 63. Holding that whether such a shareholder meeting was lawful 
or not could not be decided on summary judgment, the Second Circuit in September 1986 
reversed and remanded the issue to the Bankruptcy Court for trial. [d. at 69. 
245 "Drug Company Asks for Protection from Consumers," N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at 
1. From 1975 to mid-1985, A.H. Robbins, along with its insurer, Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company, had paid approximately $517 million for 25 trial judgments and 9300 settlements. 
A.H. Robbins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 nA (4th Cir. 1986). By August, 1985, 
when Robbins filed its petition under chapter 11, there were 5000 suits against Robbins. [d. 
at 996. In May, 1986, the Fourth Circuit held that the Robbins chapter 11 reorganization 
proceeding stayed not only suits against Robbins but against the non-bankrupt defendants as 
well. [d. at 1016. Since then, there have been no reports of further progress. 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In creating financial and economic policy, one of the first priorities 
of Congress should be to assure that polluters pay for the cleanup 
of their industrial waste sites. People who are known to have little 
regard for the public's health and the environment, or the laws 
protecting them, should not be permitted to continue managing busi-
nesses as ~ result of bankruptcy protections. The danger of this 
abuse is illustrated by the recent bankruptcies of Manville246 and 
A.H. Robbins.247 Each of these companies filed for reorganization 
pursuant to chapter 11 of the Code. In each case, the bankrupt "had 
strong balance sheets at the time of filing but faced potentially 
devastating claims. "248 Manville sought protection from asbestos-
related health claims; A.H. Robbins, producers of the Dalkon Shield, 
filed for prot~ction against thousands of petitioners claiming injury 
from use of the intrauterine device. These cases illustrate the chal-
lenge to health and environmental laws created by corporate man-
agers seeing bankruptcy as an option to paying the costs of disposal, 
management or cleanup. 249 
This result is contrary to a long line of jurisprudence that has held 
that a polluter can and should be required to pay for the prevention 
or clean-up of its wastes. Indeed, this requirement is being codified 
to an increasing extent in federal statutes. In RCRA250 and CER-
CLA,251 Congress chose to provide for the payment by industry of 
the care and handling of hazardous wastes. In effect, Congress 
sought to provide incentives for the internalization of externalities. 252 
Moreover, under recent hazardous waste legislation,253 many tradi-
tional methods of treatment and disposal will become obsolete or 
extremely expensive because of the congressional mandate for a 
reduction in and disposal of hazardous waste.254 So, too, in the Clean 
246 N. Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at 36. 
247 GAO Report, supra note 6, at 29. 
248 See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text on RCRA's financial assurance require-
ments. 
249 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text on CERCLA's financial assurance require-
ments. 
250 See generally Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 584, 586-87 (1981) [hereinafter Allocating the Costs]. 
251 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3221. 
252 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1155 (November 1, 1985). 
253 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(1) (1970). 
254 A primary air quality standard is one which, "allowing an adequate margin of safety, [is] 
requisite to protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(I) (1982). 
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Air Act Amendments of 1970,255 Congress adopted a strict approach 
to internalizing the costs of pollution. The Clean Air Act required 
pollution sources to assure that certain national primary air quality 
standards256 were met "as expeditiously as practicable but . . . in no 
case later than three years . . . . "257 The U. S. Supreme Court con-
strued that requirement in Union Electric Company v. United 
States Environmental Protection Agency.258 In Union Electric, the 
Court rejected claims that cleanup of sulfur dioxide emissions could 
be postponed because "various economic and technological difficulties 
had arisen [that] ... made compliance with the emission limitations 
impossible. "259 The Court held that the provisions of the Act were 
"intended to foreclose the claim of emission sources that it would be 
economically or technologically infeasible for them to achieve emis-
sion limitations sufficient to protect the public health within the 
specified time. "260 Indeed, substantial jurisprudence calls for the 
prevention of environmental degradation, and the protection of the 
public health and safety, even if destroying the viability of a com-
mercial entity in the process.261 
Requiring protection against corporate waste is not simply good 
public policy, it is dictated, as well, by sound economic theory. If 
the producer of a toxic hazard is truly without adequate means to 
fund its cleanup, the polluter's creditors should pay. The creditors 
may be innocent bystanders, but they are likely most capable of 
quantifying and distributing the risk. It is this risk-taking ability 
that led a New York federal district court in Hall v. E.!. Du Pont 
de Nemours & CO.262 to impose a theory of enterprise liability263 on 
an industry-wide basis in tort claim proceedings. Citing workmen's 
compensation, respondeat superior, and strict liability, the court said 
255 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1982). 
266 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
257 ld. at 253-55. 
258 ld. at 258-59. 
259 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416-22 (1922) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
260 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
261 Enterprise liability combines features of alternative and concert of action theories for 
proof of causation of an injury. For a discussion of alternative liability, see, e.g., Summers v. 
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d SO, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). For a discussion of the concert of action theory, see, 
e.g., Sam Finley, Inc. v. Waddell, 207 Va. 602, 151 S.E.2d 347 (1966). In contrast to these 
theories, however, the policy behind enterprise liability is that the industry, as a whole, not 
the individual corporation, should pay for damages that cannot be traced to one defendant 
with certainty where the industry, as a whole, has created the risk. 345 F. Supp. at 376-78. 
262ld. at 374. 
263 ld. at 376-77. 
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that public policy may call for liability to be placed on those best 
able to distribute the costs of the risk. 264 For liability to attach, the 
industry must be aware of the risk and able to make the expenditures 
necessary to eliminate it.265 Internalizing the costs of the risk and 
spreading the additional costs to the industry, when coupled with 
the pressures of market competition, may make the industry up-
grade its practices. 266 
In the bankruptcy context, a similar analysis should apply. Com-
panies that deal with polluters should be fully apprised of the costs 
of such business. The creditors should be informed of the costs of 
dealing with a creator of toxic wastes so that they may make in-
formed economic decisions as to the desirability of, or type of, a 
continuing business relationship with that industry.267 If financiers 
supporting producers of toxic wastes knew that liability for clean-
up could fall on them, for example, credit terms may be less friendly, 
thereby in turn internalizing the pollution costs to the polluter. 268 
Such an approach incorporates principles of economism into the 
arena wherein the environmentallbankruptcy conflict has developed. 
Economism is the belief that the economic goals and principles es-
poused by the neoclassical economic paradigm ought to be the major 
determinant of public policy and legal decisionmaking.269 Central to 
economism is the belief, derived from Adam Smith, that the unim-
paired operation of the modern economy's markets for goods and 
services will produce the best of all possible worlds. 270 In such a 
264 [d. at 378. 
265 Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Injuries and Damages 
from Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, part 1, 46 (Comm. 
Print 1982). 
266 See, e.g., Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d at 269. 
267 CERCLA embodies a system, today, that holds persons other than the operator of the 
hazardous waste facility liable. CERCLA establishes four categories of "persons" who are to 
be held strictly liable for the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. These 
include: (1) the owner or operator of the vessel or facility; (2) those who owned or operated 
the facility when the hazardous waste was disposed; (3) those arranging the disposal, treatment 
or transportation of the waste; and (4) those who accept hazardous substances for transport 
to a site where there is a release, or a threatened release, which incurs response costs. 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2), (3H4) (1982). For a discussion of whether a "creditor" falls within 
the statutory term "owner or operator," see Korhonen and Smith, CERCLA Defendants: The 
Problem of Expanding Liability and Diminishing Defenses, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 289, 296-97 (1987). 
268 A. SMITH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(6th ed. 1950). 
269 Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 
(1979). 
270 See, e.g., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 
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system, "the only kind of preference that counts. . is thus one that 
is backed up by money-in other words that is registered in a 
market. "271 Forcing creditors rather than governments to pay for 
cleanup in the event of polluter insolvency, in other words, uses the 
market economy to help regulate hazardous waste production. 
This use of the marketplace as a pollution control mechanism has 
been endorsed in a variety of contexts. Some argue that imposing 
fees that equal the cost that polluters impose on others is an appro-
priate government regulatory scheme.272 Such fees would give pol-
luters the incentive to balance the losses caused by pollution against 
the cost of abatement. 273 When the costs of repairing the damage 
done by a company are greater than its assets, reorganization should 
not be allowed. 274 
The costs of pollution could be measured by either the tort claims 
of its victims or the costs of cleaning up the polluter's wastes. 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company275 discusses these two partic-
ular measures. In Boomer, neighboring land owners accused a large 
cement plant near Albany, N ew York of causing "injury to property 
from dirt, smoke and vibration emanating from the plant. "276 The 
court found a nuisance existed, but denied an injunction halting 
operation of the plant pending development of a pollution control 
scheme. 277 The court decided that imposing upon one company the 
industry-wide costs of finding a clean-up mechanism was unreason-
(1974). See also Roberts & Stewart, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1644 (1975) [hereinafter 
Book Review]. 
271 Book Review, at 1646. The problems with sole reliance on such fees as a clean-up 
mechanism, however, are numerous. Id. at 1647-53. For a general critique of relying only 
upon fee-based regulation, see Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. 
L. REV. 1393 (1981). 
272 For an excellent discussion of this type of economic analysis, see generally Markovits, A 
Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in our Worst-than-Second-Best World: A 
Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 
1975 WIS. L. REV. 950 (1975). 
273 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). In Boomer, the court said: 
"One alternative is to grant the injunction but postpone its effect to a specified future date to 
give opportunity for technical advances to permit defendant to eliminate the nuisance; another 
is to grant the injunction conditioned on the payment of permanent damages to plaintiffs 
which would compensate them for the total economic loss to their property present and future 
caused by defendant's operations." Id. at 225,309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17,257 N.E.2d at 873. A 
discussion of which of these approaches was appropriate is beyond the scope of this article. 
274Id. at 222, 309 N. Y.S.2d at 314, 257 N.E.2d at 871. 
275Id. at 228,309 N.Y.S.2d at 319,357 N.E.2d at 875. The court noted that investment in 
the plant was "in excess of $45,000,000" and said that it sought to avoid the "drastic remedy" 
of "clos[ing] down the plant at once." Id. at 225,309 N.Y.S.2d at 316,257 N.E.2d at 873. 
276Id. at 225-26,309 N.Y.S.2d at 317,257 N.E.2d at 873. 
277Id. at 226,309 N.Y.S.2d at 317,257 N.E.2d at 873. 
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able.278 The court ultimately held~ however, that "to grant the in-
junction unless defendant pays petitioners such permanent damages 
as may be fixed by the courts seems to do justice between the 
contending parties. "279 
One legal commentator more recently articulated a cost allocation 
scheme involving greater detail than Boomer. According to this 
analysis, there are four types of pollution costs: (a) "avoidance costs," 
which: are the costs of proper disposal; (b) "abatement costs," which 
are the remedial costs of removal and cleanup following an improper 
disposal; (c) "compensation costs," which are the measure of injuries 
that occur as a result of improper disposal; and (d) "transaction 
costs," which are the costs of controlling and allocating the costs of 
hazardous wastes.280 This typology was used to quantify the esti-
mated costs associated with the hazardous wastes at the Love Canal 
in Niagara Falls, N ew York. Love Canal revealed a "typical pat-
tern:" avoidance costs of $4 million; abatement costs of $125 million, 
and compensation costs suggested by more than $2.5 billion in claims 
for personal injury. 281 
Whatever the cost measurement device, placement of the financial 
responsibility for toxic wastes on a bankrupt or its creditors does 
frustrate the policies of the insolvency statute by denying a bankrupt 
a "fresh start. "282 This goal, however, is not one that should be 
pursued at all costs. Certain companies should be forced into liqui-
dation rather than being allowed to continue to threaten health, 
safety and the environment. 283 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Two recent Supreme Court cases have highlighted the growing 
conflict between policies regulating insolvency administration and 
policies seeking to protect local health and environment. In the 1985 
case of Ohio v. Kovacs, the Court held that a bankrupt's obligation 
to expend money to fulfill a state-ordered cleanup of hazardous waste 
disposal sites was a "liability on a claim" and a "debt" dischargeable 
in bankruptcy. In Midlantic National Bank Company v. New Jersey 
278 Allocating the Costs, supra note 250, at 585. 
279 [d. 
280 [d. at 585-86 (citations omitted). 
281 [d. 
282 See supra note 40, and accompanying text. 
288 But see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 
18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927); Union Electric Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 427 
U.S. 246 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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Department of Natural Resources, the Court held that a bankrupt 
could not abandon such sites as assets having no value to the bank-
ruptcy estate. 
The Kovacs decision is particularly problematic. In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that the debtor was disabled from personally 
taking charge and effectjng the cleanup. Because of the debtor's 
disability, the Court held, all the state could realistically hope to 
gain was the payment of money from post-bankruptcy income. The 
Court therefore, deemed the remedy sought in Kovacs, to be in 
essence a money judgment dischargeable in bankruptcy. 284 
The Kovacs decision departs from prior construction of when eq-
uitable remedies are "in essence" a money judgment. The Supreme 
Court, as well as a variety of lower courts, have discussed that 
distinction in detail in a series of eleventh amendment sovereign 
immunity cases. Until Kovacs, the cases have held that when the 
expenditure of funds was ancillary to, or an adjunct to, bringing a 
program into compliance with the law, an equitable remedy did not 
constitute "in essence a money judgment. "285 The Kovacs decision 
abandoned the well-established principle that for a money judgment 
to be found, the expenditure must be retroactive,act as compensa-
tion for past damages, and represent payment for a monetary loss 
reSUlting from a past breach of a legal duty.286 In addition, the Kovacs 
principle that any debtor who for some reason is disabled from 
performing a cleanup may discharge the clean-up obligation in bank-
ruptcy is a dangerous principle that should quickly be rejected. 
Congress should act quickly to assure that hazardous waste own-
ers and operators bear the full economic cost of their enterprise. In 
the event that these corporations cannot afford to pay for cleanup, 
the costs should fall to the creditors. 
284 See supra notes 95-c103 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 146-67 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. Compare supra notes 131-36 and accom-
panying text. 
